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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERNA R. SMITH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ALBERT COON and TWENTIETH CENTURY 
HOUSING, a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants-Respondent. 
Case No. 14519 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant sought judgment for breach of a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, possession of the subject real 
property, treble damages, attorney's fees and costs. Defen-
dant-respondent, Twentieth Century Housing (hereinafter refei 
red to as TCH) counterclaimed for an order requiring plaintif 
appellant to accept defendant-respondent's payments and to 
submit an accounting of all sums received pursuant to the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, damages for abuse of process, 
attorney's fees and costs. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court rendered judgment on the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment as follows: 
1. Defendant TCH's motion for partial summary judgment 
was granted. 
2. Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment was 
denied. 
3. Plaintiff wrongfully refused defendant Twentieth 
Century Housing's tender of payments. 
4. There was no default by defendants on the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. 
5. The assignment of contract between the defendants 
was valid. 
6. Plaintiff was awarded $30.55 as reimbursement for 
unpaid net taxes. 
7. Defendant Twentieth Century Housing was awarded $1,000 
as attorney's fees, to be offset against the unpaid net taxes 
and the accumulated payments which total $1,350.55 owing 
plaintiff for the period of April, 1974, through January, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment and remand 
to the lower court solely for the purpose of determining ad-
ditional attorney's fees to which respondent is entitled. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's recitation 
of the facts includes statements not included in the pleadings 
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nor evidence presented to the lower court herein, and not at 
issue nor relevant in those proceedings. Also, appellant 
fails to include facts necessary to accurately reflect the 
status and nature of this action* Although no record on 
appeal has been filed herein, respondent, submits the fol-
lowing as an accurate and complete statement of the facts 
herein for the court?s examination. 
On or about February 2, 1965, defendant Albert Coon and 
appellant executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract whereby 
defendant Albert Coon agreed to purchase and appellant agreed 
to sell certain real property located in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. The contract recited a purchase price of 
$10,500.00, with a downpayment of $500.00. The balance of 
$10,000.00 was to be paid in monthly installments of $60.00 
with interest at the rate of 6 1/2 percent per annum. The 
remainder of the contract contained the standard provisions, 
including the requirement that the buyer assume responsibilit 
for payment of real property taxes and insurance. On or aboi 
February 20, 1974, defendant-respondent TCH and defendant All 
Coon and his wife, Oleita S. Coon, executed an Assignment of 
Contract, whereby respondent assumed all rights and obligatic 
under the aforesaid Uniform Real Estate Contract with appell< 
Said assignment of contract recited that the balance due und< 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract as of March 5, 1974, was 
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$9,391.04. Respondent notified appellant of the assignment 
by letter dated March 11, 19 74. Respondent commenced tender 
of payment of the $60.00 per month as required by the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract to appellant. Appellant refused to 
accept any of said payments, asserting that the balance 
recited on the assignment was incorrect,, the payments were 
not legal tender, and various other reasons. Respondent 
offered to make payments in any medium desired by appellant 
and requested an accounting of sums received and those due 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Appellant failed to 
specify a medium of payment acceptable to her and also 
failed to provide the accounting requested by respondent. A 
notice of delinquency was served on both defendants and 
thereafter, a notice of tenancy at will. Appellant there-
after filed a complaint alleging breach of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract because of failure to make the required 
monthly payments, and sought, as a remedy, repossession of the 
subject real property, treble damages, attorney! s fees and costs. 
Respondent answered and counterclaimed, denying a breach of con-
tract on the basis that it had tendered all required payments 
and that said payments had been wrongfully refused by appellant. 
Respondent also sought an accounting of sums paid and owing on 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, damages for abuse of process, 
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attorney's fees and costs. Subsequent to the filing of the 
complaint herein, defendant Albert Coon, died. Appellant move 
to substitute a party for defendant Coon, and petitioned for 
letters of administration. The lower court denied said motioi 
and petition on the grounds that defendant Coon had left no 
estate, the assignment between the defendants was valid, and 
defendant Coon therefore had no interest in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract subject to probate. 
After extensive discovery by the remaining parties, re-
spondent moved the court for partial summary judgment, seekin 
dismissal of appellant's complaint and judgment on its counte 
claim, excepting the claim of abuse of process- Appellant ma 
a cross motion for summary judgment on her complaint. A hear 
ing was held in the lower court to consider the motions alone 
with the affidavits and memoranda submitted, and arguments oi 
counsel. The hearing was continued for a determination of 
the balance due on the contract and any deficiencies thereon 
after each party submitted accountings, cancelled checks, 
receipts, amortization schedules and affidavits relating 
thereto. As a result of the continued hearing, Judge Croft 
awarded the plaintiff the sum of $30.55 to reconcile the 
balance due on the Uniform Real Estate Contract with that re 
cited in the Assignment of Contract between the defendants • 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE ALLEGED INCAPACITY OF APPELLANT'S COUNSEL IS 
NOT A PROPER GROUND FOR APPEAL. 
Appellant has raised the issue of the incapacity of her 
counsel in the trial court proceedings «, However, the issue 
of whether or not the health of appellant's counsel prevented 
her from being adequately represented in the lower court is 
one which requires an evidentiary hearing on matters which 
have not and cannot be adequately presented to this court. 
The statements in appellant's brief are in the nature of un-
verified hearsay with little or no probative value. Respondent1 
counsel was surprised to read that appellant's counsel suffered 
a heart attack while in court and that the lower court 
"abruptly concluded the proceedings and took the matter 
under advisement. . . . " (Appellant's Brief, Page 8). In 
actuality, the lower court heard all arguments to their 
conclusion and appellant's counsel suffered no visible 
infirmity at that time. However, respondent realizes that 
such statements, without verification, are as useless and 
self-serving as those made by appellant and will not respond 
in like kind to appellant's assertions. 
The appropriate means for seeking relief under the 
circumstances described by appellant would have been to 
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petition the lower court for relief under one of the pro-
visions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As stated by this court, relief under Rule 60(b) 
is a creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may occur 
through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the pre-
sentation of a claim or defense. Warren v* Dixon 
Ranch Company, 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953). 
Appellant's contention that her counsel "was physically 
incapacitated and was not capable of properly representing 
me" (Appellant's Brief, Page 8), falls most clearly under 
the parameters of Rule 60(b) rather than as a grounds for 
appeal. Matters on appeal are limited to questions of law ir 
law cases, or questions of law and fact in equity cases. Ru] 
72, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellate review is fur-
ther limited to the record on appeal and cannot include "mat-
ters dehors the records, such as statements or affidavits of 
counsel, certificates or statements of the clerk, or state-
ments of the trial judge." 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 4 
Rule 60(b) is applicable to those situations where 
"justice has been so thwarted that equity and good conscienc 
demand that this extraordinary relief be granted." Kettner 
v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 328, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (1962). 
Furthermore, such a motion is clearly within the exclu-
sive province of the trial court, where evidence can be re-
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ceived and a factual determination made as to the competency 
of appellant's legal counsel, and, equally important, whether 
or not the lack of competency, if established,, prevented ap-
pellant from presenting her case to the lower court. In 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company, supra, the court stated: 
The rule that the courts will incline towards granting 
relief to a party who has not had opportunity to pre-
sent his case is ordinarily applied at the trial court 
level, . . . 260 P.2d at 744. 
That this is a matter to be raised with the trial court 
under Rule 60 (b) was reiterated by this court in Airkem Inter-
mountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973) . 
The rule that the courts will incline towards granting 
relief to a party, who has not had the opportunity to 
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial 
court level, and this court will not reverse the deter-
mination of the trial court merely because the motion 
could have been granted. 513 P. 2d at 431. 
This is the rule not only in Utah, but also the majority 
view throughout the country: 
Whether there should be a new trial for misconduct of 
counsel is left almost entirely to the discretion of 
the trial court, whose action in this respect will not 
be reversed on appeal except for clear abuse of dis-
cretion. 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error §89 7. 
Therefore, the issue of the competency and effectiveness 
of appellantfs counsel ought to have been raised in the trial 
court under Rule 60(b). The decision of the lower court could 
then be appealed to this court for a determination of whether 
or not the trial court had abused its discretion in ruling, 
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based on the record presented therein- This court, at this 
time, has no record upon which to make such a determination* 
In the event that the court hesitates to deprive appella 
of a rehearing as requested by her, for fear that her content 
of lack of adequate representation may be well-founded and th 
the time has passed when she could have petitioned the lower 
court for a rehearing or other appropriate relief, respondent 
respectfully submits the following for the court's considerat 
First, the following would be presented by respondent ir 
opposition to appellant's contentions: Appellant was apparer 
ly aware of her counsel's health problems from at least the 
time of the assignment of contract between the defendants 
(Appellant's Brief, Page 7); at no time, to the best of 
respondent's knowledge, did appellant attempt to substitute 
counsel; appellant signed various affidavits during the 
course of litigation and presumably knew the contents of 
both those and other documents presented to the court; ap-
pellant was present at both hearings held in this matter; 
and, appellant made no attempt to raise the issue of effect-
ive legal counsel until the filing of her brief herein. 
Second, legal authorities and precedent in this area 
tend to indicate that appellant would not have been success-
ful even had she brought a timely motion before the lower 
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court under Rule 60(b). As stated in 68 Am.Jur.2d New Trial 
§160, 
Frequently a new trial is sought on the ground of the 
alleged incompetency or negligence of the applicant's 
attorney, or upon the ground that the attorney was 
incapacitated by illness or by intoxication. In civil 
cases the rule is practically universal that a new 
trial will not be granted on the ground of the negligence 
or incompetence of the attorney for the party applying 
for such new trial. The law regards the neglect of an 
attorney as the client's own neglect and will give no 
relief from the consequences thereof-
Utah law has followed the same rule, that improper or 
inadequate actions on the part of the moving party's represen-
tative do not usually merit equitable relief under Rule 60(b). 
Justice McDonough stated the following in Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Company, supra: 
• . . although a judgment may be erroneous and inequitable, 
equitable relief will not be granted to a party thereto 
on the sole ground that the negligence of the attorney, 
agent, trustee or other representative of the present com-
plainant prevented a fair trial. „ . . The requirements 
of public policy demand more than a mere statement that 
a person did not have his day in court when full 
opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him or 
his legal representative. 260 P.2d at 743, 744. 
In Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra, a much 
more egregious situation than that herein was presented 
where defense counsel filed a notice of withdrawal on the 
day of trial, which withdrawal was refused by the trial 
court. When neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared 
at trial a default judgment was entered against the defen-
dant. Defendant's motion for relief from a final judgment 
-10-
under Rule 60 (b) was denied by the trial court and affirmed 
on appeal. The court said: 
For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower 
court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment, the re-
quirements of public policy demand more than a mere 
statement that a person did not have his day in court 
when full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded 
to him or his legal representative- The movement must 
show that he has used due diligence and that he was 
presented from appearing by circumstances over which 
he had no control. 513 P.2d at 431. 
Appellant herein had her day in court with counsel and 
the issues were decided upon not only oral argument, but also 
a voluminous record. Respondent contends that appellant woul 
have difficulty establishing that she had "no control" over 
the situation and used 8ldue diligence". 
II 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellant has argued that the judgment of the lower cour 
was not supported by the evidence. In support of the same st 
recites alleged facts which are supposedly in conflict with 
the judgment. Also included are several statements to the 
effect that the purpose of the lawsuit was to clarify the te3 
of the contract and determine the correct balance due (Appel-
lant's Brief, Pages 10 and 13). Since the sole allegation o 
default on the contract in the complaint of appellant was 
a failure to make required monthly paymentsr issues of 
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interpretation of the contract did not arise. The balance 
on the contract was determined by the lower court pursuant 
to respondent's counterclaim and submission of the issue by 
both parties. 
However, most significantly, appellant has failed to 
refer to the record herein to support either her factual or 
legal arguments. A fundamental rule of appellate review is 
that the party prevailing in the lower court is entitled to 
have the evidence reviewed in a light most favorable to him. 
As stated in Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277 (1952), 
"if there is any competent evidence in the record to support 
the court's findings the judgment must be affirmed." In order 
to overcome this presumption the appellants 
must detail, with citation to the record where appropriate, 
the particulars wherein the evidence touching the findings 
is inconsistent therewith or is not of enough moment to 
sustain it. In Re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 
P.2d 372 (1952). 
The appellate court herein is limited solely to the record 
on appeal as a source of evidence and cannot consider extran-
eous matters, such as unsupported statements contained in 
briefs, or references to materials not before the court (See 
Appellant's Brief, Page 15, wherein she refers to attorneyfs 
bills, receipts and letters). See 4 AnuJur.2d Appeal and 
Error § 487. 
The record on appeal was not filed nor designated by 
appellant. Therefore, the decision herein must be based 
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solely on the judgment roll and the decision of the lower 
court affirmed. See, U.S. Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Mid-
vale Home Finance Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090, 1092 
(1935)• 
The rights of the parties to an appellate proceeding 
must be determined on the record before the appellate 
court. The appellate court is not required to and 
may not pass on questions not presented by the record, 
although decided by the trial court. 4 Am.Jur.2d 
Appeal and Error § 491. 
Affirmance of the trial court's judgment in situations 
such as that herein was strongly propounded by Justice Hen-
riod in the recent case of Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Company,, 
542 P.2d 183 (Utah 1975)- In Bagnall the defendants desig-
nated only parts of the record favorable to them and made 
few references to the record to substantiate their factual 
statements* Plaintiffs also failed to designate the record. 
Justice Henriod's majority opinion statesr 
As a result we have before us briefs of both sides 
loaded with unreferenced, self-serving statements of 
facts and contentions, with an apparent invitation that 
we perform their procedural obligation and conduct 
their research. We cannot indulge them such luxury 
under the circumstances here. This court, therefore, 
under elementary principles anent appellate review, 
in this particular case will presume the findings of 
the court to have been supported by adirtissable, compete 
substantial evidence—to any criticisms of which, by 
any litigants this court feels constrained to turn a 
deaf ear. 542 P.2d at 184. 
Respondent has attempted to avoid duplicating ttte sxtua 
tion described in Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Company, by not 
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responding to appellant's arguments with its own statements 
equally unsupported by any record before the court. The law 
is clear as to the result mandated herein—affirmance of the 
trial court. 
Ill 
THE CASE HEREIN SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ADDITIONAL 
ATTORNEYS FEES TO WHICH RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED. 
The subject matter of this lawsuit is a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract which provides for attorney's fees for the prevailing 
party, incurred for the enforcement of the contract. Attorney's 
fees were awarded to respondent in the lower court and any 
additional fees should be ascertained and awarded for fees 
incurred in the prosecution of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's contention that the ill-health of her legal 
counsel denied her effective representation in the lower court 
is not properly brought before this court prior to a determina-
tion of the issue by the lower court pursuant to motion 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This court lacks any record or evidence propejrly before it, 
sufficient to enable it to make a decision in relation 
thereto, and is indeed precluded by law from doing so. 
Because of appellant's failure to refer to the record on 
appeal in her argument of insufficient evidence, or even to 
designate the record on appeal, this court must presume that 
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the judgment of the lower court was supported by sufficient 
and reliable evidence and, therefore, affirm the judgment 
of the lower court. 
Respondent, if successful herein, is entitled to a reman< 
to the lower court for the awarding of attorney's fees incurr* 
by respondent in prosecuting this appeal, pursuant to the pro-
visions of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Pamela R. Taggar£0 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief, 
postage prepaid, this Q "*- day of January, 1977, to 
Verna R. Smith, 90 6 South 19th East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84108, acting pro se for plaintiff-appellant-
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